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NOTE
EXPLOITATION OF SEABED MINERAL RESOURCESCHAOS OR LEGAL ORDER?
If life on this planet truly began in the oceans, it is somewhat
ironic that man finds himself returning to the cradle of the sea for his
continued existence.' As land resources become depleted, the world increasingly turns to the bounty of the oceans, 2 an alternative made possible by a seemingly unlimited technological capability. 3 Today, for
1 See Pardo, Development of Ocean Space-An InternationalDilemma, 31 LA. L. REV.
45, 46 (1970). One may ask if man has ever left the sea. Historical uses of the seabed include
anchorage and simple harvesting of marine resources. New sodo-economic pressures have
led to greater demands on the seabed. These pressures include "1. rising rates of resource
use; 2. increasing human population; 3. exotic technologies which require more and different materials; 4. economic exhaustion of terrestrial resources; 5. production ethic, greed;
6. exploration ethic, national 'prestige,' competitive drive; 7. defense 'requirements."' R.
McNeil, Exploitation of the Continental Shelf, April 1972, at 3 (unpublished paper on
file at the Cornell Law Review).
2 Estimates of the potential mineral wealth of the oceans stagger the imagination.
In his speech to the First Committee of the General Assembly (of the United Nations in 1967], Ambassador Pardo of Malta observed that the [manganese] nodules
"contain 43 billion tons of aluminum equivalent to reserves for 20,000 years at
the 1960 world rate of consumption as compared to known land reserves for 100
years; 358 billion tons of manganese equivalent to reserves for 400,000 years as
compared to known land reserves of only 100 years; 7.9 billion tons of copper
equivalent to reserves for 6,000 years as compared to only 40 years for land; nearly
one billion tons of zirconium equivalent to reserves for 100,000 years as compared
to 100 years on land; 14.7 billion tons of nickel equivalent to reserves for 150,000
years as compared to 100 years on land; 5.2 billion tons of cobalt equivalent to
reserves for 200,000 years as compared to land reserves for 40 years only; three
quarters of a billion tons of molybdenum equivalent to reserves for 30,000 years
as compared to 500 years on land. In addition, the Pacific Ocean nodules contain
207 billion tons of iron, nearly 10 billion tons of titanium, 25 billion tons of
magnesium, 1.3 billion tons of lead, 800 million tons of vanadium, and so on."

J.

ANDRASSY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE R.EsouRcEs OF THE SEA 18 n.6 (1970).

Potential sources of petroleum beneath the ocean floor are probably more abundant
than those on the continents. Estimates range upwards from 1,000 billion barrels. See
SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND

INSULAR AFFAIRS, 91sr CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHEL App. M
(Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as SHELF REPORT].
3 See, e.g., W. FRIEDMANN, THE FUTruRE oF THE OcEANs 17-29 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as FRIEDMANN]; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Outer Continental Shelf of the

Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 299-303
(1970) (statement of Dr. M. Spangler, Director, Center for Techno-Economic Studies,
Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings];Auburn, The InternationalSeabed Area,
20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 173, 174-75 (1971).
Despite the wealth of the sea, resources remain scarce in the terminology of economics.
Even at stabilized population growth rates, technology may threaten the social order it
seeks to improve. More exotic technologies absorb greater amounts of resources in support
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example, some eighteen percent of the world's petroleum supply comes
from offshore sources; by 1980 the figure will approach thirty-five
percent.4
Man may well share the fate of the dinosaur 5 unless he becomes the
master of his own technological genius and adopts appropriate mechanisms for the rational and equitable exploitation of ocean resources.
The notion of state control of technology in the public interest continues to gain popular support., The question of ocean control must be
faced on an international level? but international decision makers may
be hard pressed to keep pace with the constant scientific advancement
of members of the world community.8
I
EVOLUTION OF THE PRESENT FRAmEwoRK
Prior to the fifteenth century, instances of assertion of rights in the
sea were isolated and limited. 9 By the end of that century, rapidly growing commercial interests gave rise to competing theories of a free as opof higher consumption patterns. Studies indicate that human survival itself may be at stake
in the not too distant future-perhaps the next century--unless consumption patterns
become drastically less extravagant or new extra-planetary sources of supply become available. See generally J. Fomms-aa, WoRLD DYNAics (1971); TImE, Jan. 24, 1972, at 32.
4 Symposium, Legal Aspects of Seabed Petroleum and Mineral Resource Development,

4 NATuRAL RESOURCES LAW. 681, 690 (1971) (comments of D. Stang, Assistant to the Under
Secretary, Dep't of the Interior).
5 "Twentieth-century man threatens to be a new kind of dinosaur, an animal suffering
from a brain ill-adjusted to its environment." FRIEDMANN 120. See also Winterhalter, Book
Review, 9 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 747 (1972). Commenting on Professor Friedmann's book,
Winterhalter states:
His thesis is simple and to the point: The developing system of laws and government for the oceans is off on the wrong foot. Unless something is done and done
now, the same attempted territorial division that has accounted for much of man's
problems on dry land will be repeated in the oceans.
Id. at 747.
6 See Pardo, supra note 1, at 45. At the threshold of what may be termed the technological growth-environmental impact syndrome is the question of the degree to which
technology can or should be harnessed in the interests of the present and future generations. Who is qualified to define the parameters of "responsible" economic growth, and by
what criteria?
7 Id. at 45-46.
8 See Gerstle, The U.N. and the Law of the Sea: Prospects for the United States Seabeds Treaty, 8 SAN DiEco L. REv. 573, 581-82 (1971). For a history of United Nations activity,
see Dole & Stang, Ocean Politics at the United Nations, 50 ORF. L. REv. 378 (1971).
9 See Freeman, Law of the Continental Shelf and Ocean Resources-An Overview, 3

CoRNPLL Iur'L L.J. 105, 106 (1970). It goes without saying that order in the sea became
grounded in economic and military power. Quaere, to what degree, if any, the present
world order has progressed from the primordial state.
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posed to a closed sea.10 The concepts of high seas and freedom of the
high seas developed in opposition to the extreme claims of maritime
jurisdiction advanced by Spain and Portugal. 1 The classic competing
expositions by Hugo Grotius12 and John Selden 3 eventually evolved
into the division of "high seas" and "territorial seas," a distinction well
established by the end of the seventeenth century. 4 The eighteenth and
10 See S. CASEY, PRECEPT FOR BErNTmc EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION 11 (1968); notes
13 & 14 infra.
11 See S. CASEY, supra note 10, at 11-12; Freeman, supra note 9, at 109; note 15 infra.
In 1494, Spain and Portugal, claiming exclusive rights, effectively divided the oceans of
the world, known and unknown, east and west of a north-south line drawn in the vicinity
of the Cape Verde Islands. Freeman, supra note 9, at 108.
12 See H. GRoTIus, MAsx LmFzUht (1608); H. GRoTIUs, DE JuE PRAEDAE (1609). Grotius
developed the free sea doctrine of the early Roman jurists. He urged that the sea, much
like the air, was not subject to appropriation. Since by its nature the sea resists individual
possession, it remains res communis-the property of all-and the exclusive property of no
one. Grotius argued his thesis in refuting Portuguese monopoly claims to the East Indies
trade bonanza through the South Atlantic. See J. OUDENDIJK, STATUS AND EXTENT OF ADJAcENT WATERS 19-20, 25-26 (1970).
13 See J. SELDEN, MARE CLAUsUM SINE DoMINIO MARis (1635). Selden "undertook to
prove that the sea is capable of private dominion and defended the broad claims of
England on the grounds of a good title based on long-standing usage backed by sufficient
naval strength." 1 A. SHALowrrz, SHORE AND SEA BouN auzs 300 (1962).

14 See Freeman, supra note 9, at 110. Professors McDougal and Burke offer a functional analysis of terms such as "territorial sea," "high seas," and "continental shell' in
the context of exclusive and inclusive claims and counterclaims in the sea by a variety
of decision makers at national and international levels of decision making. They state
that "[t]he historic function of the international law of the sea has long been recognized
as that of achieving an appropriate balance between the special exclusive demands of
coastal states, and other special claimants, and the general inclusive demands of all
other states in the world arena." McDougal & Burke, Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives Versus National Egoism, 67 YALE L.J. 539, 539 (1958) (footnote
omitted). Thus McDougal urges

caution in using these words: internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone,
continental shelf, and high seas. These are normative, ambiguous words. They
refer both to facts and to legal consequences. They purport both to describe
and to state preferences. It is better to think simply in terms of the geographical
distribution of these types of claims to waters. The labels are too often merely
reasons, justifications, that are given for different types of decisions or choices
among competing claims.
McDougal, International Law and the Law of the Sea, in TnR LAw oF THE SEA 16 (L.
Alexander ed. 1967).
Compare the following standard legal definitions used by the U.S. Department of
Commerce:
Marginal Sea (also called Territorial Sea, Adjacent Sea, Marine Belt, Maritime Belt, and 3-Mile Limit).-The water area bordering a nation over which it
has exclusive jurisdiction, except for the right of innocent passage of foreign
vessels. It is a creation of international law, although no agreement has thus
far been reached by the international community regarding its width. It extends
seaward from the low-water mark along a straight coast and from the seaward
limits of inland waters where there are embayments ....
The United States has
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nineteenth centuries witnessed efforts to define the line between territorial and high seas. The claim to a three-mile territorial limit, for
instance, grew in part out of the purported range of the eighteenthcentury cannon.' 5 With the twentieth century came a new type of
jurisdictional claim.
The Truman Proclamation in 1945 marked the birth of the continental shelf doctrine. 16 Under this doctrine, the coastal nation claims
traditionally claimed 3 nautical miles as its width and has not recognized the
claims of other countries to a wider belt.
A. SHAIowrrz, supra note 13, at 300.
High Seas.-The open sea beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, which
is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of no one nation. Littoral nations frequently exercise limited jurisdiction over portions of the high seas adjacent to
their coasts for purposes of enforcing customs and other regulations. ... The
Geneva Convention on the High Seas defines it as "all parts of the sea that are
not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state."
Id. at 293.
Continental Shelf.-The submerged portion of a continent which slopes
gently seaward from the low-water line to a point where a substantial break in
grade occurs, at which point the bottom slopes seaward at a considerable increase in slope until the great ocean depths are reached.
Id. at 285. This is a strictly geological definition.
Contiguous Zones.-Zones beyond the marginal sea over which a nation
exercises certain types of jurisdiction and control without affecting the character of
the area as high seas.
Id. at 284.
15 As the community of nations generally rejected exclusive claims in the high seas,
there developed the more modest claim to a narrow belt of territorial sea adjacent to
each nation's coast. Agreement on the width of this belt, however, was lacking from the
outset. See generally J. OuDruDIJz, supra note 12.
The three-mile cannon shot rule is generally attributed to the Dutch jurist Bynkershoek, who reasoned that "control from the land ends where the power of men's weapons
ends." Quoted in W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATRIUALS 590 (3d ed. 1971).
See also Kent, The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 Am. J. Ir'L L. 537
(1954). The rationale underlying the rule was soon to become obsolete with the advance of
gun technology. Other suggestions as to width were made in terms of fixed distances
(such as 60 or 100 miles), number of days journey from the coast, or line of sight (which
could range anywhere from 8 to 20 miles, depending upon height of eye). See J. OUDENDIJK, supra note 12, at 108.
Lacking the necessary two-thirds vote for agreement on a specified limit, the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone left the breadth
of the territorial sea undefined. A. SHALowrrz, supra note 13, at 241-42. Thus, a wide
variety of claimed territorial sea limits continues to plague those seeking a universal
standard. See generally FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
Lmrrs AND STATUS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA, EXCLUSIVE FISHING ZONES, FISHERY CONSERVATION ZONES AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (1969).
16 Professor McDougal views the continental shelf doctrine as one of many special
coastal nation claims to high seas contiguous zones:
When the concept of the contiguous zone is observed descriptively, it may be
seen to be a technical term which authoritative decision-makers invoke to honor
many various occasional and particular exercises of authority by coastal states
beyond the territorial sea ....
Easily the most spectacular, and indicative of the
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certain limited but extraterritorial rights in the sea. The Proclamation
stated in part:
Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently
utilizing its natural resources, the Government of the United States
regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the
continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts
of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to
its jurisdiction and control.... The character as high seas of the
waters above the continental shelf and the right to 7their free and
unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected.'
The Truman Proclamation was without legal precedent.' 8 Similar
jurisdictional claims by other nations followed in the Proclamation's
wake, as did more expansive claims, such as those by Chile, Equador,
and Peru in 1952 to exclusive jurisdiction for all purposes over 200
nautical miles of territorial sea.19
On the domestic front, the United States began in 1930 to assert
paramount rights over the several states to all offshore areas. 20 The mass
of litigation which ensued is popularly referred to as the Tidelands
Controversy. After major Supreme Court decisions in favor of the federal government,21 Congress, in 1953, effectively overruled the Supreme
Court by passing the Submerged Lands Act 22 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 23
The former Act quit-claimed back to the states all submerged lands
great flexibility of the concepts of contiguous zones, are the claims to the continental shelf now advanced by numerous states and accepted by most others.
McDougal S. Burke, supra note 14, at 581; see note 17 infra.
17 Presidential Proclamation 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 59 Stat. 884. Note
the justifications for the doctrine which may be gleaned from the naked text: conservation,
contiguity and appurtenance, and, possibly, national security. The distinction between
geologic definition of the continental shelf, on the one hand, and geology as a legal
justification for an exclusive claim to the shelf, on the other, must be kept in mind. See
notes 83,86, & 88 infra.
18 See Freeman, supra note 9, at 111. Professor Freeman concludes that "[w]hile memoranda of law by William Bishop tried to connect the Proclamations to plans of President
Roosevelt as far back as 1987, one is impressed with their lack of legal justification." Id.
The Proclamation may be traced directly to the then predominant position of the United
States as a victor in the war and to the increasing demand for petroleum on the eve of
technological breakthroughs in offshore drilling. See FRIEDMANN 19.
19 FRIEDMANN 48; Friedmann, Selden Redivivus-Towards a Partition of the Seas?,
65 Am.J. INT'L L. 757, 763 (1971).
20 See Lewis, Offshore Boundary and Title Issues, 4 NATURAL R.souRcFs LAW. 737
(1971).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 839 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana,
339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 882 U.S. 19 (1947).
22 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-15 (1970).
23 Id. §§ 1381-43.
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within the three-mile territorial sea. Coastal states today exercise control over these submerged lands by issuing licenses for oil and mineral
exploitation. 24 Although the Submerged Lands Act theoretically settled
the boundary dispute, significant controversy and litigation continue as
to the exact location of the federal-state boundary with respect to each
coastal state.

25

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act granted authority to the
Secretary of the Interior to license submerged lands for the exploitation
of oil and mineral resources on the basis of competitive bidding. All
domestic industry extractive activities and royalty payments in submerged lands contiguous to the United States and outside the area of
state control are conducted in accordance with the OCS Act and regulations pursuant to the Act.26 Significantly, the outer limit of federal control is not defined.
The OCS Act implemented domestically the principles embodied
in the Truman Proclamation. The 1958 United Nations Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 27 had the same effect internationally
for its forty signatories. The United States was among the major
powers ratifying this agreement. The Convention recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal nations over the continental shelf for the exploitation of its natural resources. Exercise of paramount rights to seabed resources in no way "affect[s] the legal status of the superadjacent
waters as high seas " 28 and may not interfere with "navigation, fishing,
or the conservation of the living resources of the sea" nor obstruct sci24 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 6871-78 (West 1956 & Supp. 1971); TEx. REv. Crv.
STAT. ANN. arts. 5358-82, 5421c (1962 & Supp. 1971). A tabulation of state and federal laws

may be found in Jacobson & Hanlon, Regulation of Hard-Mineral Mining on the Continental Shelf, 50 OrE. L. REv. 425, 453 (1971).
25 See Wulf, Freezing the Boundary Dividing Federal and State Interests in Offshore
Submerged Lands, 8 SAN DiEco L. Rax. 584 (1971). The Submerged Lands Act dearly gave
coastal states exclusive rights to submerged lands inside the three-mile limit. Litigation
continues concerning the rights of coastal states in submerged lands outside the three-mile
limit. The states have generally based their claims on crown charters predating the Union.
See United States v. Maine, petition for leave to file complaint granted, 395 U.S. 955
(1969) (No. 35 Orig.), special master appointed, 398 U.S. 947 (1970); Flaherty, Virginia and
the Marginal Sea: An Example of History in the Law, 58 VA. L. REy. 694 (1972).
25 See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3300-01 (1972); 30 id. §§ 250.1-.100 (1972).
4
27 Done April 29, 1958, 196 ] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. Three
related Conventions were also concluded in 1958: Convention on Fishing and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S.
No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1962] 2
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205. For a concise synopsis of these Conventions, see Freeman, supra note 9, at 113 n.31.
28 Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, art. 3, [1964] 1 U.S.T.
473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 814.
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entific research. 29 The continental shelf is delimited in Article 1 as follows:
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf'
is used as referring... to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial
sea, to a depth of 200 metres [about 650 feet] or, beyond that limit,
to where the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas ....30

The Convention's legislative history8 l reveals that the imprecise exploitability limit on national jurisdiction was considered by many states
to be subordinate to the primary 200-meter criterion and was inserted
to avoid problems inherent in applying a rigid 200-meter depth
criterion alone.32 The 200-meter criterion does bear some relation to
the geological features of the continental shelf, roughly corresponding
to the world-average depth at which declivity increases such that the
83
shelf ends and the continental slope begins.
The 1969 judgment of the International Court of Justice in the
North Sea Cases34 took the view that the concept of the continental
29

Id. art. 5(1), [1964] 1 U.S.T. 473, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 314.

30 Id. art. 1, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 473, T.A.S. No.5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312.

81 See generally J. ANDRA SY, supra note 2, at 71-76; SHELF REPORT 60-63; Freeman,
supra note 9, at 117; Hearings, pt. 1, at 57-61 (statement of N. Ely, member of council of
ABA Section of Natural Resources law). See also note 39 infra.
32 See FuziEMANN 36-37; Reiff et al., A Symposium on the Geneva Conventions and
the Need for Future Modifications, in THm LAw oF THE SFA 265, 274-75 (L. Alexander ed.
1967).
38 See S. CAsEY, supra note 10, at 3I. Submerged lands are usually classified geologically
as continental shelf, slope, rise, and abyssal depths. Starting from the abyssal depths and
moving landward, the seabed first begins to rise gently. Appropriately, this area is called
the continental rise. Next, the slope begins to rise sharply at an incline of 3.5-6%. The
land then levels to inclines of less than .2% in the area of the shelf, finally meeting the
terrestrial plane. Shelf, slope, and rise are collectively termed the continental margin. See
id. at 12, 27-29.
Although shelf rock formations are similar to those of land areas bordering the sea
(and thus constitute a natural prolongation of the land), formations on the slope begin
to take on different characteristics. Thus, the shelf-slope border constitutes a logical, though
imprecise, geological dividing line. See R. McNeil, supra note 1, at 1; note 36 infra. Great.
disparities in the depth of this dividing line do exist, however. Chile, for example, has
practically no shelf, whereas the shelf off Siberia extends 800 miles seaward at a depth of
less than 200 meters. Again, off the northern coast of Australia, the change in declivity
characteristic of the end of the shelf and the beginning of the slope occurs at a depth of
550 meters. See S. CASEY, supra note 10, at 28. "On a global basis the edge of the continental shelf ranges in depth from 20 to 550 meters, with an average of 133 meters; the
shelf ranges in width from zero to 1,500 kilometers, with an average of 78 kilometers
[about 50 miles]." Emery, The Continental Shelves, 221 SCo.AM., Sept. 1969, at 107.
34 [1969] L.CJ. 1. The dispute concerned the boundaries of the shelf between West
Germany and her neighbors Denmark and the Netherlands. The Court held the equidistance principle of article 6 of the 1958 Convention inapplicable. The Court left to the
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shelf had become a matter of customary international law, in the sense
that a coastal nation enjoys certain paramount rights to the oil and
minerals of its continental shelf. Thus, the continental shelf doctrine
applies to nonsignatories as well as signatories of the 1958 Convention. 5
The controversy surrounding the precise limits of national jurisdiction,
however, suggests that this aspect of the doctrine cannot in any fair
sense be considered settled in international law.3 6 The absence of a precise definition of jurisdictional limits and the complete lack of any international enforcement mechanisms beyond the limits of national jurisdiction represent major flaws in the present law of the seabed.
II
PRESENT DEFECTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK

A.

The Limits of NationalJurisdiction

The exploitability criterion of the Geneva Convention is both indeterminate and outmoded as a limit on national jurisdiction.37 It is
parties the task of agreeing on lateral boundaries. Two significant facts seem to have
motivated the Court's decision: (1) West Germany was not a signatory of the 1958 Convention, and (2) because of the concave nature of its coast, West Germany would effectively
have been left with no shelf had the equidistance principle been applied.
35 Id. at 22 (dictum). See D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the Generation by Treaty of
Customary Rules of International Law, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 892 (1970); Note, Further
Thoughts on a New Source of International Law: Professor DAmato's "Manifest Intent,"
65 AM. J. INT'L L. 774 (1971).
38Compare Jennings, The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible
Implications of the North Sea Case Judgment, 18 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 819 (1969), with
Friedmann, supra note 19.
The important dictum of the International Court-that coastal rights in the continental shelf have existed ab initio-is grounded on the geological characteristic of the
continental shelf as a natural prolongation of the continental land mass. Significantly, the
North Sea Shelf extends some 600 miles seaward at a depth of less than 200 meters. The
logic of the natural prolongation thesis becomes clouded when the court states:
[l]t is evident that by no stretch of imagination can a point on the continental
shelf situated say a hundred miles, or even much less, from a given coast, be
regarded as "adjacent" to it, or to any coast at all, in the normal sense of adjacency, even if the point concerned is nearer to some one coast than to any other.
[1969] I.C.J. at 30. One commentator has concluded:
Thus for all its reliance on the "natural prolongation" doctrine as the fundamental basis for the legal concept of the continental shelf, the Court apparently
does not accept that the legal shelf is always coextensive with the natural prolongation. At some point, even "much less than" 100 miles, present customary law
puts an end to coastal control. Or so the Court seems to say.
W. BruRa, LAw, SciEN E, AND Tim OcEA. 30-31 (1969).
37 See J. Ax'wRAssY, supra note 2, at 152; L. HENKIN, LAw FoR THE SEa'S MINERAL REsouRcEs 42 (1968); Emery, Geological Aspects of Sea-Floor Sovereignty, in Tnm LAw oF THE
SEA 139, 154-55 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
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not clear whether the test embraces commercial exploitability, i.e., the
ability to turn a profit, or simply the technical ability to extract a particular mineral.38 Likewise, the ability to extract a particular mineral in,
for example, 250 meters of water in one part of the world does not
mean that extraction operations will be economically or even technically
feasible everywhere at that depth.
It is also unclear which nation's technical capacity serves as the
measure, 39 that of the most technologically advanced state or that of the
particular coastal state. If Country A possesses the technology to extract
oil at a depth of 200 meters and Country B can extract it at depths of
800 meters, do Country A's rights in its own shelf extend only to 200
meters? Could Country B begin drilling for oil off A's coast in 300
meters of water? Country B would argue that Country A enjoys no
rights beyond a depth of 200 meters and that Country B is working an
area not subject to national or internationaljurisdiction. On the other
hand, if exploitability were measured by the technological capability of
the most advanced nation, the moment Country B demonstrated an
ability to extract oil at some new depth beyond 200 meters, would the
rights of every other coastal state extend automatically to that depth off
its own coast?
Although the legislative history of the Convention suggests that at
least some nations considered the 200-meter criterion to be the principal measure, 40 the rapid advance of technology has resulted in exploit38 See Hearings,pt. 1, at 125 (testimony of J. Laylin, member of the District of Columbia Bar).
39 See generally Goldie, The Contents of Davy Jones's Locker-A Proposed Regime
for the Seabed and Subsoil, 22 RUTGERs L. REv. 1 (1967).
40 See note 32 and accompanying text supra. This statement is not without significant
controversy. Compare Finlay, The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, A Rejoinder to
ProfessorLouis Henkin, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 42 (1970), with Henkin, A Reply to Mr. Finlay,
64 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1970).
A 1951 report of the International Law Commission defined the legal continental shelf
in terms of adjacency and exploitability. Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf., Art. I, [1951] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 141, U.N. Doc. A/1858 Annex (1951).
A 1953 ILC report dropped the exploitability criterion in favor of the 200-meter isobath.
Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft Articles on the ContinentalShelf, Art. I, [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L Comm'N
212, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953). A 1956 meeting of the Organization of American States at
Ciudad Trujillo rejected the uniform isobath standing alone, and, in insisting upon the
exploitability criterion, plainly envisioned areas outside the geological shelf region as subject to coastal state jurisdiction. SHELr REPORT 60-61. The 1956 ILC report on the law of
the sea, after much debate, recommended a definition similar to that of article 1 of the
1958 Geneva Convention, including the adjacency, 200-meter, and exploitability criteria.
The Commission stated:
While maintaining the limit of 200 metres in this article as the normal limit corresponding to present needs, they [the OAS states] wished to recognize forthwith
the right to exceed that limit if exploitation of the seabed or subsoil at a depth
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ability becoming the dominant measure. Thus, national boundaries expand steadily outward from the coast. 41 The United States has already
issued exploration permits for areas of the sea lying 300 miles from the
coast and at depths ranging up to 1,525 meters. 42 In a very real sense,
43
technology is dictating the legal order.
The present question of seabed control may lead to "creeping jurisdiction," not only outward from the coast, but also vertically through
the water column. 44 The fear exists that the lack of legal order in the
greater than 200 metres proved technically possible. . . . Other members contested the usefulness of the addition, which in their opinion unjustifiably and
dangerously impaired the stability of the limit adopted. The majority of the

Commission nevertheless decided in favour of the addition.
Int'l L. Conm'n, Draft Articles on the Law of the Sea, Commentary, [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
CoMM'N 296-97, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
The Law of the Sea Conference, which drafted the 1958 Convention, adopted the
1956 ILC definition after much debate, centered again on the exploitability criterion. A
motion near the end of the Conference to drop the exploitability criterion was defeated
by a vote of 48-20. See SHrELF REPoRT 62; note 43 infra.
41 See Goldie, supra note 39, at 10-11.
42 FRIEDMANN 62; see Auburn, supra note 3,at 174-75.
43 See Hearings, pt. 2, at 379 (remarks of Senator C. Pell). Professor William Burke
has summarized the intent of the signatory nations in 1958 as follows:
It seems difficult to establish that the Shelf Convention sets out any explicit
limit on the shelf even though there was undoubtedly an intent to indicate there
was a limit on coastal expansion. What the Geneva Conference apparently sought
to do was to achieve both some certainty (hence the 200-meter limit) plus sufficient flexibility to take into account unpredictable technological and economic
progress (hence the exploitability criterion in the alternative). It was very dearly
anticipated that sovereign rights could extend beyond 200 meters when the
requisite conditions came to exist. However, it is also quite dear that the conferees
in Geneva did not believe they had disposed of the entire ocean floor, i.e., they
were aware there was a limit but did not seek to establish what it might be in
advance of the social-political-economical-technological context which would call
for and permit more precise definition. In the meantime the limit was to move
outward as exploitation moved outward, to the limit of adjacency, until the Convention could be revised.
W. BuRKE, supra note 36, at 22-23 (emphasis in original). The limit of adjacency mentioned
by Professor Burke merits a moment of consideration. In the sense that adjacency has
some relation to the natural prolongation thesis, it merely states the obvious. No one
would be prepared to defend the notion that areas in the Indian Ocean, for example,
could be considered "adjacent" to the United States coast on the basis of natural prolongation. But would areas 100 miles east of Virginia, for example, be "adjacent" to that
state? 500 miles? 1,000 miles? "Adjacency" thus adds little, if anything, to the legal definition of the continental shelf.
44 See Hearings,pt. 1,at 191-97 (testimony of C. Auerbach, W. Burke, L. Henkin, and
P. Young); compare Symposium, supra note 4, at 706 (comments of T. Clingan, Professor
of Law, University of Miami).
John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor to the Department of State in 1971, referred in a
Department press release to "the historical tendency to assert more and more types of
control within fixed zones of special-purpose jurisdiction." 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERAls 1013,
1016 (1971). Professor Burke, however, discredits the "creeping jurisdiction" thesis. W.
BuRKE, supra note 86, at 25-26.
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seabed will slowly erode the area of high seas as nations claim greater
preferential rights (e.g., fishing, research, control of shipping) in an increasingly broader belt of territorial sea.45 Even now, most national
claims to exclusive jurisdiction for all purposes far exceed the three
miles claimed by the United States.46 This expanding jurisdiction may
47
lead to a new era of colonialism and conflict.
B.

The ChangingPolitical Climate
The international political climate has also undergone rather
dramatic changes since the ratification of the 1958 Convention. Perhaps
of most importance has been the emergence of new nations and new
alignments, along with militant demands by arriving nations for a
"piece of the action." 48 The problems of poverty and unequal oppor45 See FsRIMANN 118.

40 See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

supra

note

15,

at 5-24.
47 See FRIEDMANN 28; Burke, Comments on Current International Issues Relating to
the Law of the Sea, 4 NATuRAL REsouRcEs IAW.660, 664 (1971); note 56 infra. Recent inter-

national fishing disputes presage similar conflict over the seabed as petroleum and mineral
exploitation expand farther from the coast. The result seems to be inevitable in the absence
of precise, agreed-upon boundaries on zones of special state interest.
48 See Stevenson, The United States Proposalfor Legal Regulation of Seabed Mineral
Exploitation Beyond National Jurisdiction, 4 NATURAL Rasoucas LAW. 570, 572 (1971).
The sea and seabed constitute two of the leading areas in which the so-called third world
strives to shape the contours of international law, or at least to challenge traditional
notions regarding that law. "The development of new attitudes and doctrines in Latin
America, particularly in the second half of the 19th century, was the first important challenge to the dominant European character of international law." H. STmNER & D. VACTs,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMs 261 (1968). This pattern of international development

continued after World War II with the emergence of new Asian and African nations.
A former Indian judge has observed:
The bulk of existing international law is an undoubted legacy from the international community of the past-a community limited both racially and geographically....

Ils it not pertinent to inquire how far the law governing the members of
the old community can legally govern the members of the new, in the absence of
specific agreements among them?
Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?, 55 Am.J. INr'L L. 863, 881-83 (1961).
Commanding paper majorities in the United Nations, the undeveloped and emergent
nations grow increasingly reticent toward assuming any sort of follow-the-leader role
dictated by the superpowers. In light of this position, unilateral claims to 200 miles of
territorial sea by some Latin American countries (see note 19 supra) become more understandable. A European or superpower brand of international law becomes subordinate to
the developing nation's perceived self-interests.
The ramifications of these new attitudes are only beginning to be felt. Certainly some
traditional notions of international law, e.g., custom as a source of international law, will
be affected. Consider the following passage from the concurring opinion of Judge Alvarez
of the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case, [1951] I.CJ. 116, 148-49:
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tunity amidst affluence are worldwide; economic disparity is receiving
increasing attention as an international problem.
Although the limits of national jurisdiction in the seabed remain
undefined, there is a general consensus that there must be some
limit.49 The question then arises whether the seabed areas beyond national jurisdiction are res communis (the property of all nations and
therefore not subject to acquisition by any nation or individual exclusively) or res nullius (the property of no one and therefore subject to
"squatters' rights"). 5°
One concept commanding much support is that the riches of the
seabed constitute a common heritage of mankind' and therefore rightfully belong to all people of the world. This concept receives particular
support from many less-developed countries, especially those that are
land-locked.5 2 These nations view the wealth to be derived from seabed
resources as an excellent means of alleviating international poverty.
They argue that extensions of sovereignty into the seabed would serve
only to magnify the present economic inequities. Among the approximately 130 nations in the world community, twenty-nine are completely
land-locked, approximately fifty-one have very small coasts, and twentyfive have small to moderate coasts. The remaining twenty-five nations
[C]ustoms tend to disappear as the result of the rapid changes of modern international life[,] and a new case strongly stated may be sufficient to render obsolete
an ancient custom. Customary law, to which such frequent reference is made in

the course of the arguments, should therefore be accepted only with prudence.
Compare D'Amato, supra note 35. The import of these considerations for the present
analysis is dear: custom and traditional state practice in the seabed may prove totally

irrelevant to the question of what sort of rules should govern that area. The full flavor
of this ideological revolt becomes more apparent when some of the specific seabed treaty
proposals of the emergent and undeveloped nations are considered. See note 132 and

accompanying text infra.
49 See GA. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 24-25, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971);
text accompanying note 65 infra.
50 See S. CAsEY, supra note 10, at 47.

51 But see notes 66-73 and accompanying text infra. For an analysis of the grave
definitional problems associated with the phrase "common heritage of mankind," see
Gorove, The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind": A Political, Moral, or Legal

Innovation?, 9 SAN DmGo L. Rrv. 390 (1972), wherein the author concludes:
IThe reference to the rather elusive and undefined concept of "common heritage
of mankind," no matter how well motivated, in a legally binding document would
be unfortunate unless it is realized from the outset that it carries no clear juridical
connotation but belongs to the realm of politics, philosophy or morality, and not
law.
Id. at 402. For a discussion of the "common heritage of mankind" concept in the United
Nations Sea-Bed Committee, see Report of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp.
22, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/7622 (1969). See also text accompanying notes 65-73 infra.
52 See Note, The Interests of Land-Locked States in Law of the Seas, 9 SAN DiEco L.

Ray. 701 (1972).
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that would gain substantially from extensions of sovereignty are generally the already affluent nations of the world.53 Additionally, unregulated extraction of seabed oil and minerals will undoubtedly affect world
prices and depress the economies of certain less developed countries
whose national income depends largely on the exportation of the products of their land-extractive industries.5 4 Less-developed countries will
increasingly question legal arrangements which benefit the more developed countries at the expense of the less developed. 55
The absence of an established international regime for dealing with
the seabed can only lead to increasing political unrest. The lack of effective international mechanisms for cooperation may intensify extravagant claims by many less-developed countries, along the Latin American example, 6 as the have-not nations seek to guarantee for themselves
57
at least a portion of the sea's wealth.
C.

The Need for Certainty

The lack of certainty is also having a detrimental effect on deepocean miners. 58 Although the miners appear ready to begin commercial
extraction of manganese nodules from deep oceanbeds,5 9 they await the
53 See FRIEDMANN 14-16.
54 See Engo, Current InternationalIssues Relating to the Law of the Sea, 4 NATURAL
REsouRc~s LAw. 622 (1971). Hedging against this possibility, some nations seek specific
provisions for controlling world prices. See Note, supra note 52, at 780. See also Report of
the Comm. on Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 117-41, U.N. Doc. A/8721 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as U.N. Committee Report].
55 See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS B-AvE 118-20 (1968); note 47 supra.

56 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
57 These nations might be viewed as emerging neo-colonialists. Ultimately, major
powers, having thus far exercised restraint, may resort to force when their vital interests
appear to be at stake. See Burke, supra note 47, at 664. In this regard, the United States
Department of Defense, viewing continued naval mobility as a vital interest, has been one
of the strongest advocates of a clear, precise, and narrow limit to national jurisdiction in
the seabed. See Gerstle, supra note 8, at 574; Hearings, pt. 2, at 403 (remarks of Senator
C. Pell).
Potential and actual military uses of the seabed raise a galaxy of issues in addition to
naval mobility, particularly in view of the almost universal declarations that the seabed
outside the limits of national jurisdiction should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. As might be expected, reasonable men hold widely divergent views as to what does
or does not constitute "peaceful purposes." For an insightful and well-documented exploration of military uses issues, see Gehring, Legal Rules Affecting Military Uses of the
Seabed, 54 MmrrARY L. REv. 168 (1971).
58 Reiff et at., supra note 32, at 294.
59 See Greenwald, Problems of Legal Security of the World Hard Minerals Industry
in the International Ocean, 4 NATURA REsouRcEs LAw. 639, 640-41 (1971). These nodules
are estimated to contain astronomical amounts of minerals, thousands of times greater
than known terrestrial sources. See note 2 supra.
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creation of some agency competent to receive their claims. °0 Safeguards
are required to protect the enormous investments which will be ne61
cessitated by the complexities of deep-ocean mining.
A bill introduced in the last Congress"2 would have granted authority to the Secretary of the Interior to license mining activities in
deep seabed areas other than those covered by the 1958 Convention
and the OCS Act. Under the bill, licenses would have been issued subject to any future international arrangements agreed to by the United
States.0 3 Since the bill regulated only the activities of United States
nationals vis-A-vis other United States nationals, it would have been of
64
no aid to the miner in the case of competing international claims.
The realization that a new international regime may be on the
way stems, in part, from major rumblings in the United Nations. On
December 17, 1970, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the
seabed by a vote of 108 in favor, none against, with fourteen abstentions
(the Soviet bloc). In pertinent part, the resolution provided:
Affirming that there is an area of the sea-bed and ocean floor
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, the precise limits of
which are yet to be determined... [the General Assembly] solemnly
declares that 1. The sea-bed and ocean floor... are the common
heritage of mankind; 2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means ... ; 3. No State or person . . . shall claim,
exercise or acquire rights with respect to the area or its resources
incompatible with the international regime to be established. 65
...

The Resolution begs the real question of the limits of national
jurisdiction. 6 Nevertheless, it has had a chilling effect on the extraction
plans of deep-ocean miners-an undesirable state of affairs from a development standpoint. 1
Referring to the resources of the sea as a "common heritage of mankind," an expression first used by President Johnson in 1966,68 yields
60 See Greenwald, supra note 59, at 640-41.
61 See Stevenson, supra note 48, at 574.
62 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Bill, S. 2801, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
03

Id. § 10.

64 See 117 CONG. REc. S17,491-94 (daffy ed. Nov. 2, 1971) (remarks of Senator Metcalf).
For an analysis of the bill as well as an up-to-date account of deep ocean mining technology, see Auburn, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Bill, 9 SAN DIEGo L. REY.
491 (1972). See also U.N. Committee Report, supra note 54, at 111-24.
65 GA. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) (emphasis added).
60 See Friedmann, supra note 19, at 759; notes 86 & 40 supra.
67 See Auburn, supra note 64, at 493; 117 CONG. Rac. S17,492 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971)
(remarks of Senator Metcalf).
88 FRuM.MANN 28.
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much rhetorical leverage to those who favor international mechanisms
and solutions. The expression itself is vacuous. 69 The inadequacies of
the present system mandate highly political choices; 70 the "law" of the
seabed largely constitutes an area of no law. Much rhetoric bandied
about, particularly in Congress,71 seeks to clothe chosen policy positions
with legal justification. The resources of the sea may no more be a com72
mon heritage than the present framework represents law.
Present inadequacies are manifest because the system may ultimately depend on sheer force. The preferable alternative is one whereby
benefits and burdens are distributed in accordance with an equitable
international scheme. "Common heritage of mankind" may translate
into nothing more than a call for benevolence on the part of the most
technologically and economically advanced nations-a call for an international welfare society 73 Arguably, this is a desirable direction in
which to move. In any event, the policy choices should be made expeditiously, and appropriate legal mechanisms should be devised to
effectuate those choices. The passage of time will serve only to impair
the ability to act prospectively in the international community, since
interests will undoubtedly become more vested 74 and consensus will
become increasingly unattainable."
69 See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
70 See FRIEDMANN 28; Hearings, pt. 2, at 326 (statement of L. Fischman, consulting
economist).
71 See generally SHEF REPoRT.
72

Cf. note 48 supra.

78 Cf. L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 270. Whether termed aid or matter of right, the
application of seabed revenues to less-developed countries will involve a transfer of technology, or at least the fruits of that technology, from developed to less-developed countries.
See U.N. Committee Report, supra note 54, at 21-22, 28, 47.
74 See FRIE)MANN 118.
75 See id. at 119. In preparation for the Law of the Sea Conference to be convened in
1973 (see note 87 infra), the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the SeaBed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction has been meeting
since 1969. To date, the Committee's success in formulating an agenda and specific drafts
to replace the 1958 Convention has been limited. For reports of the Committee, see 24
U.N. GAOR Supp. 22, U.N. Doc. A/7622 (1969); 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/8021 (1970); 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971); U.N. Committee Report, supra note 54.
Some increased rigidity in nations' policy positions in the Committee has been evident
as sessions have progressed. Indeed, the fear has been expressed that the convening of the
1973 Conference itself may be in jeopardy, with countries seemingly moving from international to national solutions. See Stang, The Donnybrook Fair of the Oceans, 9 SAN
DIEGo L. Ray. 569, 594-95 (1972). At the dose of the Committee's 1972 sessions, the opening of the Conference in 1973 still seemed to be in doubt. U.N. Committee Report, supra
note 54, at 14-15.
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III
PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK

A.

Resolving the PresentDefects
The preceding sections have suggested three areas of difficulty
which must be dealt with before any international order can be
achieved. What should be the limit of national jurisdiction? Beyond
that limit, what basic concept should govern the seabed (e.g., common
heritage)? If international mechanisms are desirable, what character
78
and competence should they have?
With regard to national jurisdictional limits, four basic factors are
available in formulating criteria.7 7 Limits could be based on geological
features, distance from the coast, depth, exploitability, or some combination of these four. Although inequities are unavoidable in any
measure because of the widely divergent characteristics of the world's
submerged lands, a uniform isobath (depth) alone or in combination
with distance from shore has the advantage of ease of application 78
Enormous problems would accompany an international regime based
on geological features. By way of illustrating the difficulties inherent in
any limiting factor, consider the Canadian shelf, which is much deeper
than the United States Atlantic shelf. The Canadians would be unlikely to join a legal order which recognized shallow shelves but not
deep ones.7 9 From the world standpoint, geological disparities necessitate an international regime that recognizes narrow national claims,
regardless of which limiting criteria are chosen. The wider the international area, the less pronounced will be the disparities between have
and have-not nations.
The basic concept of cooperation that should govern the international seabed area has been discussed above.8 0 It should be emphasized,
however, that the time has long passed when the international community can accommodate a totally unregulated exercise of rights in the
76 See Pardo, supra note 1, at 70-71.
77 See J. ANDRASSY, supra note 2, at 76-81; Hearings, pt. 2, at 485-89 (statement of
L. Alexander, Professor of Geography, University of Rhode Island).
78 See J. ANDRAssY, supra note 2, at 117-20. A legal limit based on geological features
would divide national from international seabed areas on the basis of specified gradients
and contours of the submerged lands-for example, where shelf ends and slope begins.
See note 32 supra. Theoretically, such a limit could be constructed with no regard for
depth, distance from shore, or the ability to extract minerals.
79 See Beesley, Some Unresolved Issues on the Law of the Sea, 4 NATURAL RESOURCES
L&w. 629, 631 (1971).
80 See notes 49-55 and accompanying text supra.
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seabed. "First come, first served" is neither a necessary nor desirable
corollary of the freedom of the seas."'
A wide variety of international regimes has been suggested. The
range of suggestions can be plotted along a continuum from extreme
nationalism and flag-nation laissez faire to supranationalism in an international operating authority.8 2 Intermediate alternatives include (1) a
licensing authority, (2) a registry for claims, coupled with a code of
conduct, and (3) a purely advisory and consultative agency with no
regulatory function. 83 This range of choices is presented in ascending
order of acceptability to a state with strong vested interests in the
seabed.84 Predictably, the more control surrendered to an international
regime, the greater the voice that would be demanded by those states
with the most at stake. 85 Additional considerations are the extent to
which a regime should be linked to the United Nations, if at all, and
the extent to which the regime should promote new international
development policy. 86
Looking forward to the Law of the Sea Conference of the United
Nations to be convened in 1973,87 the United States submitted a draft
treaty8 8 to the U.N. Seabed Committee in August 1970. The draft
effected the United States Oceans Policy which President Nixon had
announced in May 1970.89 The Oceans Policy statement called for the
recognition of seabed resources as a common heritage of mankind, with
the wealth of the seas to be directed toward international community
purposes.90 Characterizing the present law of the sea is inadequate,
the President suggested a treaty which would create international ma81 See Symposium, supra note 4, at 707 (comments of T. Clingan, Professor of Law,
University of Miami).
82 See SHEF- REPORT 84-85.
83 See J. ANDRAssY, supra note 2, at 133-35; SHEL REPoRT 84-87.

84 See Labastida, The Continental Shelf and the Freedom of the High Seas, 3 CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 133, 140 (1970). On the other hand, the undeveloped and emergent nations

of the world tend to favor an international operating authority, on the premise that only
the technologically advanced nations stand to gain from a regime grounded on flag-nation
laissez faire. See text accompanying note 137 infra.
85 Labastida, supra note 84, at 140.
86 FRIEDMANN 82-83.

87 G.A. Res. 2574A, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
88 Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area, U.N. Doe.
A/AC. 138/25, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1046 (1970) [hereinafter cited as US. Draft].
For a summary of the Draft and its significance from the State Department's standpoint,
see 63 DEP'T STATE BULL. 209 (1970).
89 Statement by the President on United States Oceans Policy, 6 WrE.y CoMp.
PRES. Docs. 677 (1970).
90 Id.
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chinery to regulate all extractive activities beyond a depth of 200
meters. 91
To date, the United States Draft represents the most comprehendetailed proposal of any nation. The intense domestic debate
and
sive
which the United States Draft touched off2 forced the State Department to characterize it as a working paper that did not necessarily represent the views of the Government. The United States Draft will be
compared below with seven other proposals98 on the basic questions of
the limits of national jurisdiction and the nature of the international
regime beyond those limits.
91 Id. The United States simultaneously sought multilateral agreement on a 12-mile
territorial sea (exclusive jurisdiction for all purposes). See United States Draft Articles
on Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 188/SC. HI/L. 4, 10 INT'L
LEGAL MATERiAI. 1018 (1971).
92 For critical appraisal of the United States Draft, see Stone, The United States
Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area, 45 TuL. L. REV. 527 (1971). See
also Auburn, supra note 3; Friedmann, supra note 19, at 758-59; Jennings, The United
States Draft Treaty on the InternationalSeabed Area-Basic Principles,20 INT'L & CoMp.
L.Q. 433 (1971); Knight, The Draft United Nations Conventions on the International
Seabed Area: Background, Description, and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8 SAN Dmoo L.
REv. 459, 487-550 (1971).
93 For convenience, the various other proposals are referred to as drafts, but it
should be noted that the precision of the proposals varies considerably; some embody only
statements of principles. The proposals are as follows: International Regime: Working
Paper Submitted by the United Kingdom, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 177, U.N. Doc.
A18021 (1970) [hereinafter cited as English Draft]; Establishment of a Regime for the
Exploration and the Exploitation of the Sea-Bed: Proposals Submitted by France, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 21, at 185, U.N. Doc. A18021 (1970) [hereinafter cited as French Draft];
Draft Statute For An International Sea-Bed Authority As Submitted by the United

Republic of Tanzania, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/33, 10

INT'L LEGAL MATERLuS

982 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as Tanzanian Draft]; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Provisional
Draft Articles of a Treaty on the Use of the Sea-Bed for Peaceful Purposes, U.N. Doc.
A/Ac. 13843, 10 INT'L LEGAL MAxrmx.s 994 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Soviet Draft];
Working Paper on the Regime for the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor and Its Subsoil Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Submitted by Chile, Colombia, Equador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay,

Venezuela, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/49, 10

INTL' LEGAL MATERUA.s

1003 (1971) [hereinafter

cited as Latin American Group Draft]; Preliminary Working-Paper Submitted by
Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Nepal, Netherlands and Singapore, U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 188/55, 10 INT'L LEGAL MArEaRALs 1011 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Afghanistan
Group Draft]; Specialized Conference of Caribbean Countries Concerning the Problems
of the Sea: Declaration of Santo Domingo, done June 9, 1972, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERA~s
892 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Caribbean Group Draft]. This last conference was attended by 15 countries. Signing the final declaration were Colombia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Venezuela. Not signing were Barbados, El Salvador, Guyana, Jamaica, and
Panama.
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B.

The Limits of National Jurisdiction
The United States Draft creates an International Seabed Area
described in article I as the common heritage of mankind 9 4 open
to the use of all states in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Revenues from exploitation of the Area are to be directed toward the benefit of all mankind and, in particular, toward developing
nations. 96 The character of superadjacent waters as high seas is preserved, and contracting parties are charged with the protection of the
marine environment and human safety. 96
The International Seabed Area is to be comprised of all submerged
lands seaward of the 200-meter isobath. 97 No nation is to exercise or
assert exclusive rights in such lands nor recognize such claims if asserted
by any other nation.98 An intermediate zone, the International Trusteeship Area, is carved out of the total International Seabed Area, constituting submerged lands from 200 meters seaward to a point on the
continental rise to be determined with reference to a specified gradient
feature.9 9 Within the Trusteeship Area, the coastal state would enjoy
only those preferential rights delineated by the Convention and in
return would assume certain administrative responsibilities. 10 0 The
preferential rights would include the exclusive right to grant or deny
license applications (thus effectively limiting exploitation in the Trusteeship Area to the coastal nations' own nationals should the coastal
state so desire) and the right to retain a portion of fees and royalties. 101
The Afghanistan Group Draft, like the United States Draft, speciU.S. Draft, art. 1.
95 Id. arts. 3, 5.
96 Id. arts. 6, 8-9.
97 2. The International Seabed Area shall comprise all areas of the seabed and
subsoil of the high seas seaward of the 200 meter isobath adjacent to the coast of
continents and islands.
3. Each Contracting Party shall permanently delineate the precise boundary
of the International Seabed Area off its coast by straight lines not exceeding 60
nautical miles in length, following the general direction of the limit specified
in paragraph 2.
Id. art. I.
98 Id. art. 2.
99 1. The International Trusteeship Area is that part of the International
94

Seabed Area comprising the continental or island margin between the boundary
described in Article 1 and a line, beyond the base of the continental slope, or
beyond the base of the slope of an island situated beyond the continental slope,

where the downward inclination of the surface of the seabed declines to a
gradient of 1:.
Id. art. 26(1) (footnote omitted).
100 Id. art. 27.
101 33-50% is suggested. Id. art. 28(d).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:575

fies a coastal state depth limit of 200 meters, but it then provides for an
alternative criteion-a forty-mile distance from the baseline of a
twelve-mile territorial sea.' 02 The choice between the two methods of
delimitation would be made by each particular coastal nation at the
time of ratification. 10 3 The Afghanistan Group Draft also incorporates
an intermediate zone technique-a belt of forty more miles of sea
(from the edge of the national limit of 200 meters or of twelve plus
forty miles) in which the coastal nation would enjoy certain preferen10 4
tial rights.
The Caribbean Group advocates a continental shelf defined along
the lines of the 1958 Convention, but impressed upon this limit is
another zone of special interest called the Patrimonial Sea.'0 5 The
coastal nation would exercise sovereign rights to the renewable and
nonrenewable resources in the Patrimonial Sea, which would extend
200 miles from the coast. 00
The Soviet Draft seems to extend national jurisdiction to the full
limit of the geological shelf, regardless of depth or distance from shore.
Article 2 of the Soviet Draft employs the term "continental shelf" as
follows:
The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the sea-bed of the
high seas and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of the continental shelf. In areas where there is no continental shelf, the
provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the sea-bed of the high
102 Afghanistan Group Draft, para. I(A).
103 Id. Numerous proposals have been made joining uniform depth and distancefrom-shore criteria. Senator Claiborne Pell, for example, once advocated a national
limit for seabed exploitation at a depth of 550 meters or 50 miles from shore,
whichever resulted in more area to the continental shelf of each coastal nation. See J.
ANDRAssy, supra note 2, at 116; SHELF REPORT 12.
Apparently the distance-from-shore alternative is offered as some form of consolation
to coastal nations having a negligible continental shelf in the geological sense. Depth
plus distance-from-shore criteria point up the problems in trying to equate the legal
shelf with the geological shelf. The legal justification for a geological definition is
grounded in the natural prolongation thesis. The fallacies of natural prolongation as a
legal justification may be highlighted by a simple inquiry: If natural prolongation justifies exploitation in the continental shelf, why does it not also justify United States mineral
exploitation in Canada or Mexico-also natural prolongations of the continental land
mass? The simplistic answer that terrestrial land masses are already politically subdivided,
whereas subsea land masses are not, returns one to the crucial issue: should subsea areas
be divided by traditional means of economic and military power, or should the international community adopt new guiding principles?
104 Afghanistan Group Draft, para. I(C). The French, English, Tanzanian, and
Latin American Group Drafts all leave open the question of the limits of national
jurisdiction; none adopts the intermediate zone concept.
105 Caribbean Group Draft, Patrimonial Sea paras. 1-5.
106 Id. paras. 1, 3.
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seas, beginning
at the demarcation line provided for in article 3 of
107
this Treaty.
Article 3 of the Draft is left open. An interpretation of the Soviet Draft
which makes the legal and geological definitions of the continental shelf
coincident is in keeping with the general tenor of the Draft. Although
the Soviet Draft creates an International Sea-Bed Resources Agency,
that body is denied jurisdiction or rights in the area outside the limits
of exclusive national jurisdiction.10 8
Both the Caribbean Group and Soviet Drafts extend the limits of
national jurisdiction beyond the point where the exclusive interests
of a coastal state can reasonably be justified against the inclusive
interest of the world at large. On the other hand, either the United
States or Afghanistan Group Drafts would provide significant improvement over the present Geneva Convention's 200-meter plus exploitability limit, in terms of both certainty and legitimacy of claim. The intermediate zone concept offers a modicum of security to the coastal state
and at the same time ensures that a major portion of revenues derived
from exploitation of this area would be channeled to the international
community.
The Afghanistan Group Draft might prove to be more politically
expedient than the United States Draft. The alternative criterion of distance from shore protects nations with deep shelves and may placate
those coastal nations having a negligible geologic shelf. If inclusion of
the alternative criterion guaranteed the consensus necessary for agreement on a new legal definition of the shelf, the resulting uniformity
would certainly be worth the seemingly negligible expansion of national jurisdiction.
Major criticisms of the United States Draft0 9 focus attention on
two threshold issues in defining the limits of national jurisdiction. To
107

Soviet Draft, art. 2.

108 None of the provisions of this Treaty or the rights granted to the International Sea-Bed Resources Agency or its organs, and similarly none of the
functions exercised by the Agency or its organs, shall mean that the Agency
has jurisdiction over the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof or shall give the
Agency rights or legal grounds to consider the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof
as owned, possessed or used by it, or at its disposal.
Id. art. 26.
109 Criticisms have been lodged by the American Bar Association, the American
Petroleum Institute, and members of the Senate Interior Committee. See Ely, The Draft
United Nations convention on the International Seabed Area-American Bar Association
Position, 4 NATURAL RsoURcEs IAw. 60 (1971); Finlay, The Draft United Nations
Convention on the International Seabed Area-American Petroleum Institute Position,
4 NATURAL RESoURcEs Lmw. 75 (1971). See generally SHELF REPORT.
Support for the Draft comes from the State Department, the Department of
Defense, and the academic community. See generally Hearings, pts. 1-3.
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what extent, if any, may a coastal nation at present legitimately assert
any rights beyond the 200-meter isobath? If the nation may do so at all,
to what extent can it be expected to give up those claims in favor of
a uniform 200-meter standard? Predictably, strong governmental and
industrial interests strike out against any renunciation of "rights" in
the seabed. These critics support the expanding jurisdiction possible
under the 1958 Convention's exploitability criterion. 110 The Draft is
viewed as being in derogation of the principle of freedom of the seas
and as a sacrifice of United States rights in the sea with no reasonable
quid pro quo."' Critics stress that the United States would be sacrificing
national security interests in huge petroleum reserves with no guarantee
that other countries would reciprocate. 12 This entire line of argument
assumes that the United States and other nations already have certain
vested rights in the seabed well beyond the 200-meter isobath-an
assumption which finds little support in history and even less in law." 3
The question of the limits of national jurisdiction becomes
inextricably bound up with the issue of what sort of mechanisms will
apply in the area outside the limits of national jurisdiction, an area all
seem to agree exists despite the lack of agreement as to its boundaries. 114 Indeed it would appear that no agreement may be had on the
limits of national jurisdiction without agreement first on the legal order
which would govern the area beyond those limits.115
C. Beyond the Limits of NationalJurisdiction
The United States Draft creates an International Seabed Resource
Authority"1 6 which would have legal capacity117 and would include an
Assembly of all contracting parties, 118 a Council of twenty-four parties,119 and a Tribunal of from five to nine judges, 12 0 elected by the
Council. 121 Exploration and exploitation licenses would be issued by
110 See, e.g., SHELP REPoRT 29-33.
11 See Ely, United States Seabed Minerals Policy, 4 NATuRAL RiEsouRcEs LAw. 597,

617-20 (1971).
112 See Stevens, The Future of Our Continental Shelf and the Seabeds, 4 NATuRAL
REsouacss LAw. 646, 648, 650 (1971).

113 See Friedmann, supra note 19, at 761-62.

114 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
115 See U.N. Committee Report, supra note 54, at 19-20.
116 U.S. Draft art. 33.

117

Id. art. 33.

118 Id. art. 34(1).
119 Id. art. 36(1).
120 Id. art. 47(1).
121 Id. art. 48(1). In the Assembly, a one nation/one vote principle would apply. Id.
art. 34(4). Its powers would include election of Council members, determination of rules,

and approval of operating budgets. Id. arts. 35(b), (c), (f).
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the International Seabed Resource Authority (or the appropriate
Trustee Party in the Trusteeship Zone).122 Licenses would require
certain fees,'123 would be specific as to minerals and area to be exploited,124 and would be subject to certain work requirements. 125 The
Authority would have a right of inspection 126 and a right to revoke
licenses for cause. 127 Authority licenses would issue on the basis of
128
competitive bidding.
The Council would meet as often as necessary (id. art. 36), submit reports and
budgets (id. arts. 40(a), (g)), issue any required emergency orders (id. art. 40(j)), and provide technical assistance to contracting parties. Id. art. 41(a). The Council would also
appoint the three commissions provided for by the Convention: the Rules and Recommended Practices Commission (id. art. 43), the Operations Commission (id. art. 44), and
the Boundary Review Commission. Id. art. 45.
The composition of the Council is somewhat unique. The 24 members would include
the six most industrially advanced contracting parties (to be determined according to
gross national product) and 18 additional members of which at least 12 would be
developing countries. Id. arts. 36(1), (2). At least two members would be land-locked
countries. Id. art. 36(3). The 18 members of the Council would be selected by the
Assembly. Id. art. 35(b). Decisions of the Council would require majority vote, including
majorities of both the six and 18 member groups. Id. art. 88. An analysis of the wide
range of Council proposals which have been made by other countries and some insights
into the political motivations behind them is contained in Sohn, The Council of an
International Sea-Bed Authority, 9 SAN DIEGo L. Rrv. 404 (1972).
The Operations Commission would perform the licensing and supervisory functions
of the Council in zones outside the Trusteeship Area. It would also initiate proceedings
for violations of the Convention. U.S. Draft art. 44(2).
The Tribunal would decide all disputes arising under the Convention. Id. art. 46(1).
The Council would elect the five to nine judges of the Tribunal. Id. art. 48(1). Provision is made that the judges would represent the principal legal systems of the world,
with no two judges representing the same state. Id. art. 47. The Tribunal could impose
fines of up to $1,000 for each day of offense and award damages to the aggrieved party. Id.
art. 52(2). When a party avoided a judgment of the Tribunal, the aggrieved party could
apply to the Council which, in turn, could temporarily suspend all rights under the
Convention of the party failing to meet its obligations. Id. art. 58.
122 Id. art. 13(1).
123 Id. art. 14.
124 Id. art. 15(1).
125 Id. art. 17. Work requirements would be enforced by the payment of annual,
escalating fees by the licensee to the Authority, subject to refunding upon proof that an
amount equivalent to the fee was expended each year in actual exploitation operations by
the licensee. Id. app. A, paras. 6.5-.12; id. app. B, para. 5. Such requirements should ensure that mineral resources in the licensed area are utilized to the fullest extent possible.
126 Id. art. 19(2).
127 Id. art. 20(1).
128 Id. app. B, para. 3. The extremely detailed appendices to the Convention fill out
the main articles as follows: appendix A: Terms and Procedures Applying to All Licenses
in the International Seabed Area (e.g., principles of pollution control); appendix B:
Terms and Procedures Applying to Licenses in the International Seabed Area Beyond
the International Trusteeship Area (e.g., principles of competitive bidding); appendix C:
Terms and Procedures for Licenses in the International Trusteeship Area; appendix D:
Division of Revenue; appendix E: Designated Members of the Council.
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Although the French and English Drafts are not detailed, both
advocate a licensing function for the international authority. Under
the English Draft, prospecting licenses would be nonexclusive, whereas
development licenses would be exclusive. 129 The French plan would
distinguish fixed installation mining, which would require a license,
from mobile mining, which would require only a registration.1 30 Further, the French plan differs from both the United States and English
Drafts in that international seabed areas would be alloted to nations
for stated time periods.' 3 ' Within the alloted area, the nation itself
32
would perform the actual licensing functions.
The Soviet proposal is similar to that of the French in providing
for the allocation of seabed blocks for specified periods of time to nation states. 33 Specific licensing provisions in some form are contemplated in the Soviet Draft, but are left open for later determination. 3 4
In failing to clothe the international regime with any legal capacity,
both the French and Soviet Drafts 35 fall short of the powers conferred
in the United States Draft. 36 As such, they begin to resemble registration schemes more than true licensing authorities.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Tanzanian, Latin American,
Afghanistan Group, and Caribbean Group Drafts may be conveniently
considered together. All provide for an international operating authorThe Preface to the United States Draft contains the following caveat relevant to the
relation of the appendices to the main articles:
The draft Convention and its Appendices raise a number of questions with
respect to which further detailed study is clearly necessary and do not necessarily
represent the definitive views of the United States Government. The Appendices
in particularare included solely by way of example.
Id. preface (emphasis added).
129 English Draft, para. 9(b).
130 French Draft, para. I(b)(b).
11 Id- para- HI(B)(a)(1).
Id.
Soviet Draft, art. 10(4).
134 Id. art. 9.
'35 The English Draft leaves the question of legal capacity open. See English Draft,
para. 6.
136 Although the French Draft is not dear on the point, the French would probably reject an international authority vested with broad legal capacity. Thus, the Draft
characterizes the Conference and Committee created by the Draft as "meeting-places for
exchanges of views, negotiations and possible arbitration." French Draft, para. HI(B)(b)(3).
Further, the French Draft rejects assessment and direct collection of fees and royalties by
an international authority and provides instead that "[w]hen an exploitation license is
allocated, the State concerned should undertake both to establish and recover such a tax,
and also to contribute an appreciable share of it to any international, regional or bilateral programme of assistance to the developing countries which it may select." Id.
para. IV.
132

133
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ity with legal capacity beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 137
Licensing to nations in the area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction would be subordinate to, or even possibly foreclosed by, the
actual mining operations of the contemplated international authority.
The advantages of such a regime to the noncoastal and less-developed
states are obvious. Its implementation, however, would be difficult,
requiring, in effect, a surrender of technological know-how by the most
developed states to this new international mining firm.
The United States Draft strikes a rational balance between the
interests of have and have-not, coastal and noncoastal, and developed
and developing nations. Criticisms of the Draft nevertheless abound.
Putting aside the vested rights arguments against the Draft, 138 one
criticism bearing some legal merit is that the Draft would conflict with
the 1958 Convention.8 9 As to signatories of both the Draft and the
1958 Convention, the new Convention would clearly control. 140 In the
case, however, of a signatory of the 1958 Convention that did not become a party to the new Convention, that country's rights would continue under the 1958 Convention and would be entitled to full
recognition by former parties, at least in accordance with Article 30
of the Convention on the Law of Treaties. 141 Conflict arises because
the entire philosophy of the Draft, and of Article 2(1) in particular,
is that no contracting party will recognize any other national claims
beyond the 200-meter isobath. The weight of this argument depends,
137 See Afghanistan Group Draft, para. I(B); Caribbean Group Draft, para. 2; Latin
American Group Draft, ch. 2; Tanzanian Draft, art. 13.
138 See notes 110-13 and accompanying text supra.
139 See Ely, supra note 111, at 611; Jennings, JurisdictionalAdventures at Sea-Who
Has Jurisdiction Over the Natural Resources of the Seabed?, 4 NATURAL R-SOURcEs LAw.
829, 834-36 (1971). The broader problem is "how far it is legitimate and practicable to
attempt to legislate for third parties through a multilateral treaty." Jennings, supra
note 92, at 433.
140 Consider the Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, art. 30,
in GT. Barr. FOPRGN OrixcE, Misc. No. 31, CmaN. No. 4140, at 12 (1969), 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATERiAs 679 (1969):

3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later
treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation ....
the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible
with those of the later treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to
the earlier one:
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in
paragraph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one
of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their
mutual rights and obligations.
141 Id.; see Ely, supra note 111, at 611; Jennings, supra note 139, at 834-36. See also
U.N. Committee Report, supra note 54, at 19.
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again, on how much significance one attaches, as a matter of international law, to rights dependent upon the exploitability criterion. 142
Perhaps the most practical and meritorious criticism of the United
States Draft is that it creates a huge international bureaucracy at a time
when all relevant facts have not been collected.143 Later experience
may prove many of the detailed provisions of the draft unfeasible, particularly those provisions in the appendices relating to payments, work
requirements, and lease terms. Although present experience in the
seabed may warrant some international machinery, the scheme should
be no more detailed than the current state of knowledge can provide
for.14 4

Despite the problems inherent in some of its specific provisions,
much may be said in favor of the Draft and its basic philosophy. The
Draft, or something like it, is required to forestall further extensions of
national sovereignty and the potential for conffict attendant thereto. 14
Rather than encroaching upon the freedom of the seas, in the sense of
unimpeded extractive activities, agreement on the seabed will be more
conducive to extractive activities as well as to keeping shipping lanes
free from national claims of jurisdiction. 46 The Trusteeship Zone
provision affords to the coastal state a degree of control; at the same
time, the Draft ensures the certainty of ocean claims and removes the
47
risks of sudden foreign seizure of sea resources and operating rights.
Glosing the gap between developed and less-developed countries
48
may bring much needed international political order and stability.
Cf. Friedmann, supra note 19, at 761.
3, at 29 (testimony of N. Ely, member of council of ABA
Section of Natural Resources Law).
142

143 See Hearings, pt.

144 See Wilson,
International Environmental Management: Some Preliminary
Thoughts, 11 NATURAL REsouncss J. 507, 511 (1971). The question of what bureaucracy is

necessary to meet the task suggests two related but specific criticisms of the Draft. First,
payments required under the Draft may discourage later investment. See Symposium,
supra note 4, at 700-02 (comments of T. Ary, Chairman, Undersea Mineral Resources
Comm. of the American Mining Congress). Only rough estimates are now available relating to costs of deep-ocean extraction. Second, amendment of the Convention will be
extremely difficult should later events necessitate changes in the Convention provisions.
Under the Draft, amendments would require approval by the Council and a two-thirds
majority of the Assembly, and would come into force only when ratified by two-thirds
of the parties to the Convention, including each of the six most industrially advanced
states. U.S. Draft, art. 76.
145 See Ratiner, National Security Interests in Ocean Space, 4 NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW. 582, 589-90 (1971); compare Ely, supra note 111, at 617-20.
146 Cf. Gerstle, supra note 8, at 574; Symposium, supra note 4, at 687 (comments of

J. Stevenson, Legal Advisor, Department of State).
147 See Symposium, supra note 4, at 690-93 (comments of D. Stang, Assistant to the
Under Secretary, Department of the Interior).
148 See Knight, supra note 92, at 542-43; Ratiner, supra note 145, at 585.
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The basic developmental orientation of the draft augurs well for the
promotion of resource extraction. This plan will provide the world
with new sources of supply, and in the long run it should benefit industrial interests as well as consuming nations.149
CONCLUSION

The need for new order in the international seabed becomes increasingly intense as technology continues to march seaward. Unregulated national exploitation of the seabed may lead to new levels of
international strife and conflict. The United States Draft proposal for
the seabed succeeds in a rational accommodation of the competing interests of coastal nations and the world community at large.
At a minimum, new legal order in the seabed must provide for a
system which guarantees mutual recognition of and noninterference
with various extractive activities and which provides mechanisms for
the peaceful settlement of disputes. Hopefully, it might also supply a
means of ensuring that the wealth of the sea is distributed so as to
lessen economic disparity among nations.
John E. Dombroski
149 See Ratiner, supra note 145, at 588-89.

